

AUKUS -INTENSIFYING US-CHINA STRATEGIC RIVALRY AND ITS IMPACT ON SOUTH CHINA SEA

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ABSTRACT

On September 15, 2021, a historical safety agreement was revealed. The setup of a joint venture between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia was devised to exchange sophisticated military understanding as well as provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australian troops. The eventual aim of the cooperation, as well as its consequences for other countries, are becoming increasingly prominent. France was enraged that the accord had been cancelled, leading to the destruction of a valuable submarine sale. China views itself to be the emerging grouping's primary goal. Despite varied sentiments, the ASEAN community usually sees the announcement of AUKUS as worsening the country's geographic position. Why did the three-member governments decide to form a trilateral defence pact? Such bold recruitment, according to this report, represents a pivot in US strategic vision, dispersing troops by enabling partners to develop conventional forces throughout the Indo-Pacific. It represents an eagerness on the part of Australians to exert force to better shape the peace and stability in their favour, improve their power and status within the American allied powers, and strengthen their English identities. The emergence of a new inner Commonwealth core, according to this article, has disrupted the balance of power by possibly accelerating hostilities, heightening geopolitical instability, and compromising essential atomic agencies.

Research question:

Multiple questions arise when it comes to the AUKUS pact, the strategies of superpowers, and their plans about this pact and how far they will go in this war of fire. What will be the consequences after implementing such ideas and plans in underdeveloped countries? What is the viewpoint of the European countries about this alliance? Sino-American rivalry and AUKUS's intensifying impact worldwide. Also, these questions come into the queue when we talk about reality. How is the strategic rivalry between the US and China being affected by AUKUS? How is AUKUS intensifying the South China Sea dispute?

Theoretical framework:

Balancing represents the most fundamental concept in global affairs, especially for realists. To live in an anarchic environment, governments build security coalitions against the most successful nations, according to the balance of power theory. The theory posits that states balance against those that represent the greatest threat via increasing advancements. As a result, geographic vicinity, combat power, suspected intentions, and comparable power capabilities are regarded as key considerations in establishing the degree of danger. The study revealed that governments usually

follow two kinds of tactics when it comes to balancing action: internally and externally balancing. Internal balancing refers to state operations aiming at increasing power by boosting financial outlook and military might to become self-sufficient in the face of growing challenges. It can still be accomplished by armed services modernization, domestic defence sector investment, and increased economic growth. External balancing entails states joining alliances to strengthen their power capabilities in the face of a prevalent danger. In international relations, the posture and legislation of a person or country protect itself from that other foreign entity to balance its authority against either edge.

Methodology:

This paper is based on qualitative research that has been collected from multiple resources, including articles, journals, and web pages. This will tell you about the trilateral pact and its significance from different countries' perspectives. After collecting numerous key points about how superpower rivalries affect international relations. European countries and their points of risk, their concerns about this pact, are also included in this paper. AUKUS drew few specific references to China's Pacific antagonism. This defence pact, on the other hand, is just a clear sign of the West's concerns regarding China as an opponent. The hostility that exists in Washington against Beijing has so far not arisen out of anywhere not arisen out of nowhere, where and since two countries' relations have degraded. From a theoretical IR standpoint, Australia's dependency on the United States and, indeed, the development of AUKUS demonstrate threat politics at work.

INTRODUCTION

The accord between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) for the hindmost two to supply Australia with nuclear-powered submarine and underwater drone technologies has shaken and disturbed international relations. It will also significantly alter the strategic dynamic in the South China Sea, as one of the submarines' main objectives will be to prevent China from gaining control of the area. In terms of the potential for great power conflict, the South China Sea is one of the most dangerous regions on the globe. General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, elucidated that his contention that his pledge to Beijing during former President Donald Trump's administration was necessary because China was concerned that the US would attack it there while conducting military exercises with aircraft-carrier strike groups. Australian Defence Minister Peter Dutton defended the AUKUS decision, saying the goal was to "improve Australia's capability to safeguard its territory as well as those of friends in the region."

However, former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd questioned whether the pact meant the submarines would be "interoperable with American submarines in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, or perhaps the East China Sea amid China's unsolved territorial issues with its neighbours?" If that's the case, we're on our way to

becoming an active belligerent against China in a future conflict..."

These deployments would indicate to China that the US and its allies aim to deny it the South China Sea's protective buffer. This isn't just a tactical move by the US and Australia; it's a threat to China's existence. It also means that the US can use the fear of a nuclear attack to intimidate China because it may not be able to respond. The pact will "seriously harm peace and stability and accelerate an arms race," according to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian. China will doubtlessly strive to increase submarine secrecy and anti-submarine combat abilities. The nuclear-powered submarines will enable Australia to patrol the South China Sea invisibly and detect, track, and, if required, strike China's nuclear-powered and armed submarines headquartered in Yulin, Hainan, once they are operational. This is referred to be "deterrence" in the West, but it is viewed as an existential "threat" in China.

Literature Review:

The AUKUS defence alliance, signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, aims to counterbalance China's hegemony in the South China Sea, as per international experts, while governments in Southeast Asia are seeing the alliance as a source of continental strife. 18th of September, 2021 - The situation in the Indo-Pacific territory is fast deteriorating; this time, the

South China Sea and even the Taiwan Strait are at risk. One of the most recent impetuses was the unveiling on Thursday of an enhanced security alliance known as AUKUS between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, which seems undoubtedly meant to combat China's dominance in the region. Surprisingly, AUKUS has left out France, a strong ally of the United States and Australia, with whom France had a deal for the sale of submarines that were abandoned. The recall of France's ambassadors from both nations was announced today, which would be seen as a slap by France. Many experts predict it will be perceived by the 27 members of the European Union as a slap in the face from the United States, reflecting yet another misstep by the Biden Administration in dealing with Fellow Europeans.[1]

Mapping is indeed an essential tool for establishing occupied territory demarcation, and China is no stranger to including them in this function. Graphics are always an important part of the government's "three warfare"—public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal military tactics, which are utilized in South China. Beijing has been using various cultural goods to bolster its maritime territorial claims since the 1950s, without Pine Gap has become the most prominent leader. China's new plans, as it considers national security, do not respect country borders or sovereignty, which is stunning but maybe no longer astonishing. We've recently witnessed several incidents of China's state-sponsored overreach (maritime militia in the South China Sea, its coast guard law, and so on). The whole of them indicates how, through the Belt and Road, the government is broadening the scope of its impact in the local neighbourhood, the wider Indo-Pacific, but throughout the Eastern hemisphere. The term "the existence and power" relates to the use of not just diplomatic or political influence, but also increased power and resources for military, naval, and, throughout this example, increased use of information systems.

Satellite photography has revealed growing Chinese efforts to reclaim territory within the South China Sea by enlarging existing islands or constructing new ones entirely in recent years. China has established ports, military buildings, and airbases, in addition to pouring sand onto existing reefs, especially in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, where it has twenty and seven outposts,

respectively. The Woody Islands have been militarized by China, which has deployed fighter jets, cruise missiles, and a radar system. Because it safeguards its political, security, and economic interests in the region, the US has conducted FONOPs and bolstered backing for Southeast Asian partners to counter China's assertive geopolitical claims and land reclamation initiatives. In reaction to China's strong presence in the disputed territory, Japan has sold military ships and equipment to the Philippines and Vietnam to strengthen their marine security and prevent Chinese aggression.[2]

The AUKUS security partnership is undoubtedly a step forward for the United States in the area and a means of placing Afghanistan behind it soon. It is also a step forward for the United Kingdom, as Prime Minister Boris Johnson needs something to put Brexit behind him and boast that the country has re-entered the international market. A large part of China's rhetoric focuses on greater integration and stability. 'Peace, stability, and prosperity are among the most frequently used terms in Chinese discourse. This is evident in phrases like "we should deepen our unity and coordination among ourselves, overcome problems and meet challenges, and promote regional peace, stability, and prosperity". These words and phrases appear in documents referring to regional events such as ASEAN, ARF, or East Asian summits, but they also appear to a lesser extent in documents relating to Sino-Filipino relations, such as joint comments on the issue and quotes from the Philippines' Defence Minister. The PRC rhetoric frequently refers to specific policies such as its 'Good Neighbours Policy' and the famed 'Win-Win Cooperation,' in addition to its push for peaceful cooperation and development. [3]

Furthermore, the PRC uses the 'peace, stability, and prosperity' discourse to push the other claimant states to address their differences "peacefully through mutual friendly consultations". As a result, the PRC views the conflict as a possible hazard to regional peace, stability, and prosperity, and calls for peaceful discussion and resolutions. The PRC uses the pronoun 'we' rather than 'we and them.' In this approach, the PRC portrays itself as a worldwide peacemaker while still implying that China cannot achieve peace on its own. [4] The current situation in the South China Sea must be viewed in the context of previous history. Following World War II, the United States

established itself as a permanent major power in East Asia. In addition to far-flung island territories in the South Pacific (previously controlled by Japan), the US maintained a large military presence in Japan and maintained close ties with South Korea and the Philippines, a former colony. Following the Korean War, each of these countries signed formal defence treaties and established a new, permanent military presence in South Korea. Maoist China posed the greatest threat to American regional domination, first during the Korean War and subsequently through communist insurgencies throughout Southeast Asia, culminating in the Vietnam War (1963-75). Despite its failure in Vietnam, the United States emerged in Southeast Asia in a remarkably favourable strategic position, with intact alliances with Thailand and the Philippines and good connections with Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.[5] Outside of Indochina, communist insurgencies had been effectively repressed by the end of the 1970s. Relations with Vietnam had begun to recover rapidly by the mid-1990s. The US Seventh Fleet patrolled the region's seaways unabated, including the South China Sea, and had agreed-upon access to ports throughout much of the region. Aside from the AUKUS, the Quad, and Afghanistan, China and Russia continue to strengthen their ties between the two countries. In fact, the two nations' alliance may not be the outcome of every government's confrontation with the United States. Instead, it is characterized by mutual interest, its leadership's shared worldviews, the complementary nature of the two economies, and geopolitical concerns, beginning with the long-shared border. The relationship between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping is important, but it is not solely based on subjective affinity.[6] However, whereas the relationship between China and Russia is tight, it's not excessively so, such is customary among big countries.

Discussion:

The South China Sea is a significant strategic and economic thread of the Indo-Pacific since this provides a commercial activity gateway for a substantial quantity of the world's merchant ships. It's also home to several complicated disputed territories that have caused conflict and regional instability across the Indo-Pacific. Geologically, the South China Sea plays a major role in Indo-Pacific diplomacy. Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia,

Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam all border the South China Sea. A considerable share of the world's commercial merchant shipping goes through these oceans as a reflection of their recent industrial growth. Even though anti-government agencies have some adaptability throughout this relationship owing to the accessibility of misdirection sea routes that avert the South China Sea, Japan and Korea rely heavily on South China for the supply of petroleum and natural resources, and even an outsource pathway. it also has large, though unorganized and overfished grounds, as well as unexplored oil and gas potential, which adds to the worsening of maritime and border issues. The Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Pratas, Natura Islands, and Scarborough Shoal are the primary island and reef formations in the South China Sea.[7]. The growing conflict between China and the U.S. is progressively overshadowing the perennial South China Sea geopolitical concerns. Such a struggle is typical, although concisely described as a strong State opposing the US-led "regulations world peace," fuelled by a historic power shift. As a result, China aims to wield power in proportion to its expanding financial and strategic capabilities, beginning with a regional order that matches its interests. Meanwhile, the United States seeks to maintain the post-World War II order that it feels contributed to Asia's remarkable progress and security, whilst still promoting its objectives. Such ideologies collide inside the South China Sea, in which some analysts predict a regional war that could escalate into a full-fledged conflict. The contest has ramifications for bordering individual liberty, common conventions, and indeed the possibility of catastrophe. China and the United Nations both have a plan to work together, including minor territorial disputes, to establish a regional order that can absorb friction and avoid conflict.[8] The pact is indeed a paradigm of balance-of-power diplomacy, wherein the governments strive to confront the dominance and potential threat of one nation by arming other regions only with the best to monitor it. Even though China wasn't highlighted in President Biden's announcement of the agreement, Walt believes AUKUS is a response to "increasing impressions of such a rising Economic threat" caused by the nation's economic improvement, military might, and communist ambitions there in the South China Sea.[9]

Nuclear subs, in particular, have a high financial price; in recent decades, they were at the Centre of corruption scandals in Greece, Portugal, and Pakistan/France. The Australian decision to pull out of the deal with France's Navy Groups was not unexpected, but apparent assurances from Australian and American officials to their France rivals in previous times have elicited an outraged response in Paris. France may well not end up missing out on the potential to go toe-to-toe with China in the South China Sea, but it is dissatisfied with its diminished authority in America.

The possibility that Australia may employ these submarines to patrol the South China Sea poses a special threat to China, as anti-submarine warfare is one of its military weaknesses. "Underwater warfare capabilities have been Beijing's Achilles' heel," as former US deputy national security adviser Matt Pottinger put it. The South China Sea serves as a "natural shield" for China's national security. [10] That body of water houses its crucial communication sea routes, which it believes the US could and would destroy in the event of a conflict. But, more importantly, it provides "shelter" for its second-strike nuclear submarines, which are the US's insurance against a first strike – something the US, unlike China, has not denied. China is already attempting to catch up in terms of drone capabilities and has made significant strides in recent years. Unmanned aerial vehicles have made the most progress, but Beijing is also increasing its development of unmanned undersea vehicles, which has sparked debate in the region. The AUKUS pact also emphasizes Australia's ties with countries along the South China Sea's littoral. Malaysia is afraid that the pact may exacerbate regional conflict. However, Australia should be concerned about the attitude of its near-huge northern neighbours. Even though this agreement is between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and has far-reaching implications for regional strategy implementation and international affairs. It has pushed – or pulled – Australia into the middle of the US-China contest for regional dominance, causing tensions with its neighbours. It's unclear whether Canberra intended or expected this. [11]

Inside the South China Sea, there are complex dispute situations, such as territorial disputes and maritime boundary conflicts, that have yet to be resolved. Indonesia is being extremely cautious in its dealings with the United States. Within SCS,

there is a disagreement. Apart from the concerns that exist in the South China Sea conflict, there have been incidents as a result of tensions between disputing countries that have not been able to reach an agreement. To be halted till today, there are also worsening trends, particularly in terms of the two ASEAN member countries' ties; Vietnam wins in the end. attacking China, as well as the Philippines. That regional conflict in China's South China Sea relates to the national seaborne portions of both the Two Knew or should have known and Spratly islands. In general, regional countries participating in the South China issue claim possession of the sea area and the two island groups of the South China Sea, Chinese Ocean Authority, for historical and physical grounds. It, for instance, has contested the occupied areas from 2000, claiming control of the sea area and the two Paracel and Spratly islands, and afterwards claiming that the Chinese govt released a chart defining China's control since 1947, dubbed the "Nine Dashed Line." Similarly, according to such a territorial methodology accepted by the 1982 global maritime policy conventions, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei Darussalam, plus Malaysia claim that parts of the South China Sea area are part of their Extreme Economic Zones (EEZ). Countries interested in the Disputed South China Sea are frequently embroiled in conflicts involving state militaries. Confrontational action to tackle possession of both the South China Sea region exasperate as well as obstructs regional security, and even has the potential to disrupt the interests of countries outside the territory that aren't even closely engaged in the South China Sea disagreement, including Indonesia and ASEAN countries.

Both the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands are particularly noteworthy for such reasons listed:

The place is strategic.

With its strategic location as a commercial shipping channel and an information-sharing route linking the Indian Ocean as well as the Pacific, the South China Sea is a vital location.

Natural Resources are number two.

This Spratly Island is rich in resources. It holds a variety of oil and gas production. It possesses 17.7 billion metric tons of petroleum resources, which are greater than Kuwait's oil resources (13 billion tons).

The problem that Europe faces has become apparent as the rivalry between the United States and China has grown. With the recent announcement of a trilateral deal between the US, the UK, and Australia, Washington's engagement in the 'Indo-Pacific' has shifted beyond mere security coordination towards the building of alliance blocs, even if on an ad hoc basis.

This apparent change from balancing China's rise to direct confinement exacerbates the problems that have arisen as a result of Washington's regional posture, in which maintaining American supremacy would be an objective in itself. With high-profile standoffs over Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, the Biden government's aim for encouraging "sustainable competitiveness" would almost certainly remain tough to reconcile. China's inability to accept any criticism on these topics, whether justified or not, is emphasized.[12] Its aim is to be considered an equal judge of international law. China, according to the Joe Biden government, is now the only rival capable of uniting economic, political, military, plus technical strength to launch a sustained challenge to the worldwide system's stability and openness. The growing economy of China is the biggest serious threat facing the United States in world relations of the twenty-first century, according to the Washington policy establishment. As a result, it's less probable that US-China ties would return to where they were before Donald Trump's presidency. Despite President Xi Jinping's growing autocratic government, there is indeed a discussion regarding whether China has become a revisionist state.[13] Although it is unclear whether Xi's governance poses a systemic threat to the US-led liberal international system, it is widely acknowledged that the emergence of China's economic and military power, as well as the rapid pace of technological progression, has a significant effect on every significant United States country's interests. The above raises a central issue for the US Quad and consort in the Indo-Pacific, since it influences both ongoing and prospective relations between the US and China, accordingly.[14]

This raises multiple questions here: do such economies, especially China's rivals, see China's ascent as little more than a big danger to their foreign policy as well? Or are they seeing escalating US-China conflict as the primary threat?

A few Asian countries, it appears, see rising US-China tensions as a greater threat than China's ascent. This stark difference in their perspectives on China's ascent has gone largely unnoticed and undiscussed in the international policy community – or at least in the Washington policy community.[15]

This agreement is expected to diminish the alliance's strength & effectiveness by diverting focus and power away from Japan, too, and onto the next mass transfer trio. It doesn't imply a Quad can go away; rather, the four-person unit will be weaker and less relevant than in the previous. AUKUS also provided one more compelling, if regrettable, reason that the Japanese assert whole and grow out of that now more than at any point before WWII. Japan has little choice but to bite the bullet and chart a further independent geo-strategic- strategic course, one that is quite dependent upon US assurance. China's strong behaviour has already been highlighted by Washington as a danger to the US-led international system as well as its major overseas objectives. China's growth as a naval power, in terms of its economic dominance, has raised US fears about the territory. [16]China's hostile tactics against Taiwan, as well as its increased naval actions in the South China Sea, are seen as attempts by China to control the Indo-Pacific area. In this regard, due to the growth view of China as little more than a threat, the USA has launched initiatives to establish a balanced alliance towards China via AUKUS. [17]

AUKUS seems to be a test for the EU and its "Indo-Pacific Development Partnership." Since two of them, AUKUS and Europe's Indo-Pacific agenda, aim to maintain a rules-based liberal international order, their approaches are completely separate. In terms of China, AUKUS is so much more antagonistic, whereas the EU plan is more cooperative and broad-based, emphasizing "an equal and honest framework both trade relations," and even an environmental degradation and interconnectivity strategy. For much of the main European nations, AUKUS enrages the French both by hijacking a naval purchase contract and even by putting France here on the defensive diplomatically and militarily. Relationships between France and the AUKUS economies are expected to sour, hurting the European complex interplay between Canberra, London, and especially Washington.[18] Because

France, which has the most forward-deployed marine assets between EU countries, will be an exception in its condemnation of and resistance to AUKUS, maintaining the EU's unity in systems and policies within the Indo-Pacific becomes more challenging. Germany's work as part of Europe's Indo-Pacific policy, on the other hand, will be more difficult for several factors. Once and foremost, the French will not view AUKUS in a kind and welcoming light. The Europeans might be suspicious, if not outright hostile, of AUKUS as a result of France's rage. Furthermore, because AUKUS might exacerbate external risks as a result of China's protests against the Anglican merger, the strategic environment for Germany may become more unstable. Additionally, because AUKUS has trumped and outflanked the EU, imposing German goals inside Europe's Indo-Pacific context are more limited. As a consequence, Germany could be compelled to build more strategic autonomy and direction for itself outside of Europe.[19]

AUKUS seems to be a fusion of multiple reactions to China's Silk Road Economic Belt, as well as land disputes within the South China Sea, the Mekong area, and beyond. It's an important part of a thread UK in AUKUS brings the Atlantic Ocean into the Indo-Pacific equation, requiring a rethinking of international geopolitics' outlines and tendencies. China would appear all the more besieged and angrier as a result of just these 3 visions.[20] As a result, the short-term consequences are easy to anticipate. Since India and Japan's collective strength has already been inadequate to call China to check, AUKUS outflanks the Quad and its FOIP base. India's natural autonomy prevents this from being dragged further into the Australia-America alliance towards Beijing, despite its contentious issues and tensions with China. However, Japan sees China as a geopolitical opponent and a safety danger, but it must forge all its way in negotiating without Beijing. Nonetheless, no country with a direct land or marine boundary opposite China seems prepared to risk Beijing's anger. This is why the Quad can only travel a certain distance. As well, the European Union has a lot riding on AUKUS. This is a big obstacle for Europe's Indo-Pacific Agenda. Even outside the EU forces the United Kingdom has to carve out its niche. The subject of what kind of great power the UK wants to be is at the heart of the debate. Being a great power, as the Kingdom

seems to want to be, coincides with associated expenses as well as capabilities that this could find difficult to deploy. In AUKUS, Australia, on the other hand, has a lot of tactical coherence. Australia aspires to be a powerful, stable global superpower capable of standing tall in the pursuit of its national interests. AUKUS is likely to further irritate this same UK's relationship with the EU and has its own, more independent Indo-Pacific policy. But the UK, via Leave but now AUKUS, obscures the waters even more by undermining the European Project and the broader rules-based liberal international order – wherein Europe seems to be the biggest success. The preservation of that order, which is a key goal of the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy, will be more difficult to achieve. Furthermore, AUKUS inflames the EU's French foundation by still stealing major navy procurement deals, or by putting France in a frontal diplomatic and defence affront. Regarding EU countries in the area, Paris has the most forward-deployed marine capability.[21] As more than just a consequence, growing improvement in economic collaboration is a critical component of the EU plan. The text anticipates the anticipated conclusion of trade negotiations with Australia, Indonesia, and New Zealand, and also the continuation of talks with India. Furthermore, the possibility of resuming trade arrangements with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, as well as the potential negotiation of a region-to-region trade agreement with ASEAN, will indeed be assessed. Due to the general rising conflict here between the U.S. and China inside the Indo-Pacific, each U.S. action, particularly those related to safety, is examined by Asian Countries. These conditions & implications of such AUKUS proclamation made the EU a perfect partner for ASEAN, allowing the two organisations can advance strategically.[22]

This should be stressed, however, that the South China Sea dispute is not an intra-ASEAN problem. Though other ASEAN marine member countries are also involved, including Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Philippines, the largest claimant, China, would not be an ASEAN sovereign nation. [23]Despite not being a signatory to the issue, Indonesia does indeed have a great interest but has actively been involved in various provocations and clashes around China's illegally claimed nine-dash line in the South China Sea. However, it does not directly affect all of ASEAN's member states.[24]

Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, for one, are still not parties to the issue and have never publicly faced the Chinese in the South China Sea. It is indeed worth noting because ASEAN national governments are divided into two groups: coast guard ASEAN nations, which are largely claimants in the dispute, and land-based ASEAN countries, which were not actively involved in the dispute. Importantly, ASEAN member states like Laos and Cambodia have relied largely on the Chinese in the past. China has been the most important factor in the growth of both Cambodia and Laos, through international aid initiatives, including overseas investment. Although if ASEAN decided to invade and help to solve the conflict, it would be difficult for the organisations to take a firm stance against the problem because its countries are heavily reliant on Imports.[25] In addition, the beginnings of ASEAN must be taken into account. The association is not intended to become a bilateral agreement like NATO, in which all members agree that a threat to one of its partners is a danger to all.[26] That has never considered a specific nation to be the common threat of all its partners. Consequently, even though China directly threatens the interests of many ASEAN member nations on the issue, it appears that the institution will remain silent for the time being, ignoring its goal for regional stability.

Conclusion:

This trilateral accord is based on the American pledge to give atomic thrust systems to Australians to activate a huge agile of submarines. This AUKUS pact is about more than just the specifics. By signing this accord, Washington had made it very clear that it intends to push China strongly in both rhetoric and policy. However, by doing so, it threatens to significantly harm conventional partners' core ties and start a continuous cycle that might lead to disaster. The following are the two main compelling reasons to push this agenda forward. First, ensuring that China and others know that this collaboration will not allow Australia to install nuclear weapons on its submarines in the future is beneficial. Foremost, rather than being perceived as yet another attempt to limit future tech exchange at a moment, because once nuclear power is growingly being considered as a means of mitigating global warming, such concepts can be embraced by major vendor

countries (such as China, France, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States).

Findings:

The deal covers the exchange of information and technology in a range of fields, particularly information, atomic technologies, and nuclear warhead procurement.

These powers are suspected of committing a Soviet Union attitude & intellectual bigotry.

Such countries seem to be considering adopting a Soviet-style mentality and ideological prejudice.

Many believe that having them positioned in Australia is key to US hegemony in the region.

For the first time in 5 decades, the United States is sharing its submarine expertise. Earlier, it had exchanged technologies solely with the United Kingdom.

China has been incensed by criticism of China's early handling of the outbreak, which has been led by the United States.

As a result, the USS America, a US Naval aircraft carrier, and an Australian cruiser were dispatched to adjacent waterways.

The movement by two US Naval guided-missile destroyers, the USS Breed's Hill & USS Barry, near the Knew or should have known & Sprite, correspondingly, escalated the intensification.

- The ships performed Sea lanes Operations (FONOPs) in foreign ships to challenge how the US sees as a trend of China's illegitimate assertions.

In terms of China, AUKUS is so much more antagonistic, whereas the EU plan is more cooperative and broad-based, emphasizing "an equal and honest framework both trade relations," and even an environmental degradation and interconnectivity strategy.

Matter of fact, the two nations' alliance may not be the outcome of every government's confrontation with the United States. Instead, it is characterized by mutual interest, its leadership's shared worldviews, the complementary nature of the two economies, and geopolitical concerns, beginning with the long-shared border.

Summary:

International relations have been jolted and upset by the agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) for the latter two to equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines and underwater drone technologies. It

will also have a big impact on the strategic dynamic in the South China Sea, as one of the submarines' primary goals will be to prevent China from acquiring control of the region. The South China Sea is one of the most dangerous locations on the planet in terms of great power war. General Mark Miley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained that his vow to Beijing during the administration of former President Donald Trump was vital. China is fearful that the US would attack it while conducting military exercises with aircraft-carrier strike groups in the area. The AUKUS decision was justified by Australian Defence Minister Peter Dutton, who stated that the purpose was to "increase Australia's capability to preserve its territory as well as those of friends in the region." These operations would signal to China that the US and its allies intend to deny it access to the South China Sea's protective buffer zone. This isn't just a bluff by the US and Australia; it's a direct threat to China's survival. It also means that the United States can use the threat of a nuclear attack to intimidate China by implying that it will be unable to respond. According to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian, the treaty will "seriously undermine peace and stability" and "accelerate an arms race." Without a doubt, China will work hard to improve submarine secrecy and anti-submarine combat capabilities. Once operational, the nuclear-powered submarines will allow Australia to cruise the South China Sea quietly, detecting, tracking, and, if necessary, striking China's nuclear-powered and armed submarines based in Yulin, Hainan. In the West, this is referred to as "deterrence," while in China, it is viewed as an existential danger.

Suggestions:

In conclusion, the AUKUS agreement marks a true strategic breach, bringing the Western Pacific into something like a clash of competing power blocs that haven't been seen since the Soviet Union's demise. Australia became a critical state inside the Indo-Pacific as a result of its alignment with US policies, allowing it to provide all the security considered necessary for noncombatant and armed services maritime traffic throughout its prospective conventional warfare capabilities, whilst also remaining a major rear base area for any American effort against China.

On average, the advantages seem substantially to increase the benefits, given that several of the

hazards described previously have already been factored into the Australian president's current projections, nuclear submarines or not. Even though AUKUS is still in its infancy and developments are moving at a breakneck speed, it has committed the three countries to concrete security cooperation and is a "defining moment in Australia's long alteration to an Indo-Pacific region dominated by China's authority and assertiveness. Or at the very minimum, Australia will be better prepared if the worst-case situation happens as a consequence of AUKUS, which is equipped with stronger armaments.

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